


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WEEKLY SUMMARY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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The unusual unity heretofore evident among Yugoslav leaders is giving way to uneasy alliances which will have important effects when Tito goes.	
NEW TRAVEL FOLLOWS LIU SHAO-CHI'S INDONESIA-BURMA TRIP	7
Having promoted Afro-Asian camaraderie and side-stepped controversial issues in Djakarta and Rangoon, the Chinese Communist chief of state is now in Phnom Penh and will go on to Hanoi.	

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Cuba

CASTRO'S VISIT TO THE USSR

The reception Fidel Castro has received in Moscow tops that given any other foreign visitor and has been matched in the recent past only by the more spontaneous outpourings which greeted the Soviet cosmonauts. The Soviet leaders apparently intend to use the visit not only to emphasize their determination to protect Cuba against US pressures but to strengthen their position within the world Communist movement prior to bilateral talks with the Chinese.

Castro has had two meetings with Khrushchev thus far. The first, which lasted two hours, presumably covered serious discussions on economic and military aid matters. Castro has also been honored by an all-day visit to Khrushchev's home where there was ample opportunity for further discussions.

In addition to trying to improve the strained relations which resulted from the crisis last October, the Soviet Union is also concerned with indications that Castro has more than a little sympathy for the line Communist China preaches. While Castro is restrained from moving too far in Peiping's direction by his heavy dependence on Soviet support, he has not hesitated to express his approval of many of the more radical Chinese concepts. Khrushchev is, therefore, probably

willing to go a good distance toward meeting Castro's desires on further economic and military aid.

Castro probably would like to obtain a Soviet-Cuban treaty which would commit Moscow more firmly to Cuba's defense than have its vaguely worded promises up to now. Khrushchev, mindful of the difficulties this would bring in his relations with the United States and wary of Castro's erratic behavior, probably would prefer not to sign such a pact. He may be willing, however, to reiterate in a communiqué previous general pledges of Soviet assistance if Cuba is attacked.

The length of Castro's projected stay in the Soviet Union is still unknown.

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There are rumors that Castro might stay as long as a month, but a maximum of two weeks seems more likely.

The Foreign Department in Bern has stated that Castro had expressed a desire to visit Switzerland after the Soviet Union and it is prepared to issue a visa if he requests one. Castro will probably also go on to visit Algeria sometime during the month.

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The Communist World

RECENTRALIZATION OF CONTROLS IN CZECH ECONOMY

Czechoslovakia's return to centralized party economic management probably will do little to bolster the sagging economy. Since the decision to recentralize made at the party congress last December, the bureaucracy has been greatly enlarged--a move which will not increase efficiency and is already causing confusion between local authorities and the new control organs.

So-called People's Control Commissions are being "elected" at all levels to supervise plan implementation and economic performance with powers to initiate production changes. The commissions are being staffed with trusted party members to ensure strict regime control. For management of agriculture they are being supplemented at all levels by Agricultural Production Administrations, which replace the local government organs formerly responsible for agricultural production. They are ultimately subordinate to the newly formed Central Committee - Government Commission for the Management of Agricultural Production, under party ideologist Jiri Hendrych, and are to be guided by local party organizations on management and production problems.

In the industrial sector, the extensive responsibilities given to individual enterprises in 1960 have been reassumed by government ministries. Several ministries, including those for transport and communications

and for power and fuel, have been split or reorganized and new state offices and committees for production matters have been created.

Similar reorganizations in the Soviet Union and East Germany have resulted in widespread administrative confusion. The same may be expected in Czechoslovakia, where an entire chain of command has been created side by side with the existing organs. The lines of authority are unclear, but the new measures will bring the existing state organs under more effective central control of the party.

Aside from possibly curbing local corruption and perhaps providing for stricter application of economic priorities, these purely administrative measures will contribute little to the solution of basic problems--inadequate incentives, manpower shortages, and foreign exchange shortages, among others.

Inasmuch as this is the second major reorganization since 1960--when numerous personnel shifts were made and responsibilities divided--complaints can be expected from those being shifted for a second time or possibly left without positions. The purely bureaucratic solutions offered by the regime for very real sources of dissatisfaction--food shortages, for example--may increase popular discontent.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY


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YUGOSLAVIA'S LEADERS



Tito addressing 1959 party meeting, with half the party's 14-man Executive Committee standing behind him: (left to right) Aleksander Rankovic, Edvard Kardelj, Djuro Pucar, Lazar Kolishevski, Miha Marinko, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, and Veljko Vlahovic.

Tito with Executive Committee members Edvard Kardelj, Petar Stambolic, Aleksander Rankovic, and Blazo Jovanovic, waiting at airport to greet visitors in 1955. (Man facing Rankovic is unidentified.)



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The Communist World

POLITICAL INFIGHTING IN YUGOSLAVIA

A bitter struggle is taking place for political position in the new Yugoslav government now being formed. Those involved in the struggle, which is not in any way a move to unseat Tito, are looking ahead to an anticipated succession crisis when Tito, who will be 71 on 25 May, leaves the scene.

Tito appears to be playing the role of senior statesman, apparently hoping that his lieutenants can agree on a division of top posts that will endure when he is no longer there to enforce it. The unusual unity of the Yugoslav regime--based on the camaraderie of the veterans of the World War II partisan struggle--is being replaced by uneasy political alliances.

As part of a thorough shake-up, Belgrade announced on 18 and 19 April the replacement of 10 out of 18 secretaries--the equivalent of cabinet ministers--in the Federal Executive Council (FEC), as well as a number of lower ranking officials. These appointments came, however, only after stormy sessions of the party's executive committee, one of which broke up on the 17th without reaching any decisions.

The new appointees are almost all persons of relatively minor importance. Only three are central committee members, comparative newcomers chosen in April 1958 at the last party congress. The outgoing officials have been retained as FEC members without portfolio, moreover, until after national elections "to assure continuity." Both these facts raise the possibility that the appointments represent a stand-off compromise.

Disagreement also raged in the executive committee over filling the top three government posts under Tito, who was named President of the Republic for life in the constitution on 7 April.

In a conversation with Ambassador Kennan on 25 April, Rankovic confirmed that Belgrade is having unusual difficulty making personnel changes and implied this was due to the resistance of the older, partisan generation to any change. In addition, personal ambitions, nationality questions, and the unresolved, two-year-old debate on economic policy have undoubtedly been significant factors.

No public announcement has been made on the top three posts, and on 24 April Belgrade called a party central committee plenum for the first half of May. It is not clear whether Tito will use this forum to ask for rubber-stamp approval for the executive committee's decisions or refer these decisions to the central committee for further debate.

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The Communist World

NEW TRAVEL FOLLOWS LIU SHAO-CHI'S INDONESIA-BURMA TRIP

Liu Shao-chi, apparently satisfied with his recently completed tour of Indonesia and Burma, has embarked on a second round of state visits to South-east Asia. Returning only briefly to China, the Chinese Communist chief of state and his party arrived in Phnom Penh on 1 May and are scheduled to leave for Hanoi after about a week in Cambodia.

The Chinese travelers have thus far concentrated on soft-sell tactics to achieve limited objectives. Liu and Foreign Minister Chen Yi have played up Peiping's camaraderie with the Afro-Asian bloc since the Bandung conference in 1955 and have endeavored to counter the impression of Chinese bellicosity created by the border war with India last fall. They have avoided firm commitment on controversial issues. Although economic aid was probably discussed, they made no public mention during their visit of increased aid to Indonesia, and apparently side-stepped attempts to get a firm commitment of opposition to Malaysia. Although Liu declared in speeches that Peiping was against the proposed federation, the final communiqué--issued on 20 April--contained only one cautious sentence on the subject.

The communiqué nevertheless reflects Chinese success in put-


ting over the idea of Sino-Indonesian community of interest. It promised Chinese support of Djakarta's call for a second Afro-Asian conference. Perhaps in exchange, Peiping received a statement of Indonesian approval for the Chinese position on the Sino-Indian border dispute. The communiqué emphasized the need for continued struggle against "imperialism" and "colonialism"--a theme Peiping has been stressing in the Sino-Soviet polemic.

The communiqué released in Rangoon on 25 April suggests that, to foster an image of amiability and reasonableness, Liu settled for much less than he desired. The statement contained no anti-US venom and handled with restraint the subject of opposition to imperialism and colonialism. On Laos--an issue Peiping is using elsewhere to attack the US--the Rangoon communiqué noted only that Burma and China were concerned about the situation and believed that the countries involved should abide by the Geneva agreements and respect Laotian neutrality.

Apart from Peiping's reluctance to become involved in issues on which its interests are not vitally affected, the only problems encountered by the visiting Chinese thus far appear to have come from the austere and wooden personality of Mao's heir apparent. The situation was retrieved on more than one occasion by the lively and attractive Madame Liu.

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Asia-Africa

LAOTIAN SITUATION REMAINS CRITICAL

Souvanna Phouma's efforts to settle the Laotian crisis through negotiations continue to face grave difficulties. Although he succeeded in bringing together representatives of Kong Le and the Pathet Lao for discussions which began in Khang Khay on 2 May, the positions of the two sides are far apart.

The basic demand of the Pathet Lao is that rightist military support of Kong Le's neutralist forces be withdrawn, not only from the Plaine des Jarres area but elsewhere in Laos. Prince Souphannouvong, titular leader of the Pathet Lao, has suggested that the country be divided into two zones, one for the Pathet Lao and neutralist factions and the other for General Phoumi's rightist faction, with Vientiane a special zone under tripartite administration. The Pathet Lao leader claims this would restore peace and provide for interim administration pending discussions with the conservative faction and national reunification.

Kong Le's conditions for a settlement reflect his deep distrust of the Pathet Lao. In addition to a full cease-fire and respect for zones controlled by the three factions, Kong Le

wants International Control Commission (ICC) teams stationed at such places as Khang Khay, Ban Ban, Xieng Khouang, Mahaxay, Muong Phine, and Tchepone. The Pathet Lao remain adamantly opposed to ICC presence in the field. Souphanouvong has been sending Souvanna a stream of protests against the stationing of a team--less the Polish member--at Kong Le's headquarters by a vote of the Indian and Canadian members of the ICC.

Dissident neutralist Colonel Deuane, with Communist support, has now assumed the mantle of the commander of the "true neutralist force" and has issued several patronizing appeals urging "reactionary neutralists" to see the light and join the "patriotic" ranks.


The military situation in the Plaine des Jarres has remained uneasy, and Kong Le has continued preparations to retake lost positions. In central and southern Laos, Pathet Lao activity has increased, and [redacted] the North Vietnamese military presence there is growing. [redacted]

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Asia-Africa

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY INTENSIFIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Communist guerrilla activity in South Vietnam has recently intensified. The largest single Viet Cong action in several months occurred on 27 April when a force estimated at two battalions struck a government security unit in mountainous Kontum Province, inflicting many casualties and destroying much equipment. The attack followed a series of smaller raids on strategic hamlets and other installations in the coastal areas of adjacent Quang Ngai Province, larger strikes (including at least one in battalion strength) on military posts in the southern tip of South Vietnam, three company-size attacks east of Saigon, and increased sabotage of rail tracks and bridges.

The Communists apparently are trying to slow the government's pacification programs and prevent inroads into traditional Viet Cong strongholds. They may also be attempting to undercut the psychological impact of President Diem's announcement on 17 April of a nationwide "open arms" policy toward surrendering Viet Cong followers.

The incidents demonstrate a continued Viet Cong capability to carry out coordinated military actions over wide areas of South Vietnam as well as effective concentration and dispersal of striking units. In Quang Ngai, however, the Communists appear to have suffered heavy losses, reported at close to 400, from counteroperations by South Vietnam's newly formed 25th

Division. Government troops acted quickly and enlisted considerable peasant support in this area, where systematic politico-military pacification is under way.

The Communists probably will not sustain such a level of activity. In the past, they have fluctuated between periods of aggressiveness and of relative slack, during which units train, regroup, and replace losses. There are persistent reports of at least local shortages of food, ammunition, medicines, and recruits, and some drop in morale is indicated by increased defections in recent months. A recently captured document tends to substantiate that the Viet Cong hope to counter the strategic hamlets through infiltration and penetration of their administrative controls as well as through military and terrorist harassment.

Hanoi, meanwhile, periodically cautions its supporters in South Vietnam not to expect an early victory. However, Premier Pham Van Dong's speech to the North Vietnamese National Assembly on 29 April assessed the Viet Cong's prospects in more optimistic terms than usual, saying the insurgents' growing strength had forced the US to stop boasting that they would soon be wiped out. Hanoi is also moving toward more open acknowledgment of its directing role over the Viet Cong. A recent party theoretical journal described the North Vietnamese party as the "brains" of the revolution.

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Asia-Africa

CONGO PARLIAMENT MAY DEFY ADOULA

Premier Adoula's dispute with the Congolese Parliament over his plan to recess that body may soon come to a head. He has so far been able to stall Senate action on a bill requiring Parliament's consent for a recess, but feeling on this issue is so high that if Adoula does declare a recess--as he says he will--an attempt to defy him seems certain. His opponents may introduce censure motions against the government or try to function regardless of such a declaration.

Parliamentary leaders suspect that Adoula would not call them back before the 1964 elections and would govern by decree in the interim. A

censure move is already pending against Adoula's new minister of information, and the anti-Adoula Chamber of Deputies president Midiburo says that Parliament means to have its say over the much disputed retraining of the Congo Army "by NATO." Another sore point is Adoula's failure to release leftist leader Gizenga.

In Katanga, Tshombé, under pressure from the Katanga assembly, has reshuffled his government, retaining four key ministers from his previous cabinet. Despite the recent reconciliation between the northern Katanga Balubakat Party and Tshombé's Conakat Party, no leading Balubakats were included.

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Europe

COMING EEC MEETING BEARS ON US TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS

The 8-9 May meeting of the Common Market's Council is expected to deal with several issues vital to the future of the EEC. Decisions reached at this meeting will also have a substantial bearing on the EEC's will and ability to cooperate with the US in expanding freer trade around the world. Because the issues to be discussed involve

conflicting economic and political interests among the EEC members, and in particular those of France and West Germany, there is a possibility that accords cannot be reached and that frictions within the EEC will be revived.

The main issues to be dealt with are: institutional reform,

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Europe

relations with Britain, common agricultural policy, and policy toward the US Trade Expansion Act (TEA). Specific measures as well as their timing would be decided.

Although many believe that institutional reform is the vital issue facing the EEC, prospects are poor for any major overhaul. Agreement has evidently been reached to reconsider the perennial questions of a stronger assembly and merger of the EEC, EURATOM, and CSC executives. However, on 19 April, De Gaulle reiterated his hostility to the evolution of the community's institutions on supranational lines. Nor are hopes high for agreement to formalize UK-EEC contacts in Brussels, where the British mission has recently been strengthened. So far France has balked even at the idea of informal consultations among the UK mission, the member countries' missions, and the EEC Commission.

In any case, progress on either of these questions probably hinges on what agreement is reached on EEC farm and tariff policies. Although the broad outlines of the common agricultural policy (CAP) were set in January 1962, significant decisions have not yet been taken, and the basic regulations for trade in dairy products, beef, and rice are lacking. France, with its major farm interests and political objective of consolidating the community, insists that absolute priority be given to completion of the CAP. West Germany, how-


ever, with vital commercial links outside the EEC and facing painful adjustments when the CAP is fully implemented, would subordinate progress on the CAP to agreement on the terms of EEC participation in the TEA. The positions of Italy and the Benelux countries, with interests in both spheres, have been equivocal.

Because of the EEC's importance in the commercial world, the future of the US trade expansion program hangs in the balance until these problems are resolved. The contracting parties to the GATT are scheduled to meet at the ministerial level in Geneva on 16 May, and the US has hoped that sufficient agreement would be reached at this time to permit the complex preparation for the actual tariff talks to begin.

US insistence that the GATT negotiations cover trade in farm produce is unlikely to be satisfied, however, unless France receives some assurance of satisfaction from its EEC partners regarding the CAP. Moreover, the EEC's attitude toward the reduction of industrial tariffs continues to reflect the strength of French influence within the EEC. In the GATT preparatory talks last week, for example, the French succeeded in introducing the idea of tariff harmonization (not just reduction as the TEA calls for) by the major industrial nations--this despite flat warnings from the US that it would interpret continued support of this approach as an EEC refusal to negotiate at all.

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Western Hemisphere

THREAT OF HAITIAN-DOMINICAN HOSTILITIES SUBSIDES

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The presence of the five-man OAS commission in Port-au-Prince for several days, coupled with Haiti's guarantees of safety for refugees in the Dominican Embassy, has greatly reduced chances of immediate Haitian-Dominican hostilities. However, Dominican President Bosch's animosity toward Haitian dictator Duvalier--he is encouraging Haitian exiles--is unlikely to subside. There are hints from diplomatic circles, moreover, that the OAS investigations of Dominican charges against the oppressive Duvalier regime may eventually lead to recommendations for collective sanctions against the Haitian Government.

The atmosphere in Port-au-Prince remains tense despite the withdrawal of Haitian troops from the Dominican Embassy compound. Large-scale arrests are continuing, and are alleged by some Haitians to be aimed at obtaining hostages to ward off the threat to the dictatorship.

Both countries are maintaining combat readiness, but no sizable new military movements have been reported.

Bosch has gained by his handling of the situation--receiving, for the first time since his inauguration in February, support from virtually all of the country's diverse political elements. Promulgation of his constitution--a subject of much controversy--was carried off with little opposition during the heat of the crisis. Bosch has aimed his public statements against Duvalier himself and has avoided taking an anti-Haitian tone. His government has granted political asylum to the consul general of the now-abandoned Haitian Embassy. Prominent Haitian exiles Louis Dejoie and Pierre Regaud have been featured on Dominican radio promising that "the days of Duvalier are numbered," and Bosch's statements and theirs have been carried in Creole for Haitian consumption.

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Western Hemisphere

PANAMA AGAIN HARPING ON CANAL ZONE TREATY

Foreign Minister Solis' public threat on 25 April that Panama will press for early renegotiation of the 1903 Canal Treaty was probably timed largely for internal political effect, and will probably set off a new propaganda campaign likely to last until the presidential elections next year.

Opposition newsmen, politically powerful in Panama, are privately critical of Solis for the "confused and contradictory" statements in his "ultimatum" to the United States. However, opposition elements are unlikely to take public issue with Solis, since drastic readjustment of the US role in the Canal Zone is an aim commanding universal popular support.

A strongly nationalistic and popular radio commentator has suggested that, in order to reinforce demands for a new treaty, Panama withdraw all requests for economic aid from the US and make clear its mistrust of the Alliance for Progress. Economic planning chief David Samudio recently told US economic aid officials

that dissatisfaction with the treaty affected all Panamanian development problems and complained that the level of US aid for 1963 is too low.

Both Solis and Samudio are presidential aspirants, as is UN delegate Aquilino Boyd, author of the proposal that gross canal receipts be evenly divided between Panama and the US. They and other politicians can be expected to continue harping on Panamanian dissatisfaction with the course of current discussions on relations with the US, and on Panama's apprehensions over the possible use of nuclear power to construct a new sea-level canal.

The Chiari government last year requested the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide technical advice on the latter subject. It may also welcome the initiative for a regional agreement on denuclearization of Latin America announced on 29 April by Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

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Western Hemisphere

BRITISH GUIANA LABOR TRIES SHOWDOWN WITH JAGAN

The general strike called by British Guiana's Trade Union Council (TUC)--now in its second week--has dealt the pro-Communist government of Premier Jagan at least a temporary setback. By maintaining discipline over some waverers in the ranks and showing unexpected determination, the TUC not only has succeeded in prolonging the strike but also has forced Jagan to modify labor legislation which, in its initial form, precipitated the walkout. Nevertheless, it is questionable that the strike marks the emergence of a sustained or effective opposition to Jagan.

However, Jagan now will find it more difficult to use the labor bill, as he had originally intended, to gradually gain control of the trade union movement. Voted by the lower house on 22 April, the amended bill requires Senate passage and signature by the governor, both of which are likely to be virtually automatic. Negotiations on further amendments may resume between the TUC and Jagan, although neither has much room left for maneuver. Governor Grey's veiled threat on 25 April to dismiss civil servants if they continue to strike has been condemned by most Guianese as an unwarranted interference on Jagan's behalf in the colony's internal affairs, and has strengthened the strikers' solidarity. Jagan nevertheless seems to be hoping to drag out the talks until the strike collapses for lack of funds.

If the TUC gained all its objectives without recourse to

violence, it would acquire new significance in the colony's political life as a check on Jagan potentially more effective than the opposition parties. The TUC will continue, however, to be hampered by the attitude of its largest affiliate, the Manpower Citizens Association, whose members, primarily sugar workers, tend to vote for Jagan in legislative elections and have not been enthusiastic about the strike.

The opposition parties have not been involved up to now

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London has alerted reinforcements for the 600 troops now in the colony. The TUC might resort to sabotage if the strike begins to collapse. Government supporters might also deliberately provoke violence, should they feel their position weakening, in order to bring out the British troops on their behalf.

As yet, Jagan has shown no inclination to resign under pressure. If he did so, he would probably request new elections, which would complicate the situation even further. Nevertheless, his recent effort to find a scapegoat for the strike in alleged US interference suggests that he feels hard pressed.

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